Access denied: Dragging and dropping URL icon into links folder

How can I get around this? Is there a place where I can disable some
parts of the security profile?

In Internet Explorer: Dragging and dropping the icon in the present
URL to the links bar is allowed. Dragging and dropping the icon to a
FOLDER on my links bar creates an access denied!##%%!!


I am sick of this type of security.


The stupid thing is I can drag and drop it to the links bar, cut it
and PASTE it into the folder. Thanks, Microsoft, for the added extra
steps in the name of security.


This type of nonsense makes a joke of security.
I don't want to turn off the User Account Control, I just want to
SHAPE it.



microsoft.public.windows.vista.general

eganders <eganders@xxxxxx>'s wild thoughts were released
on Thu, 18 Sep 2008 05:17:22 -0700 (PDT) bearing the
following fruit:
Dragging and dropping can be a problem when the source and
destination have different elevation types.

Out of interest what version of IE are you using?


--
Jan Hyde (VB MVP)

https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/profile/Jan.Hyde

> Jan,

The operating system is Vista and the IE is IE7.

I am not sure what an elevation type is, but I would surmise that we
are talking about whether I have been working with the same user name
and as an administrator all along. I have except that I turned off
the UAC during installation of all my programs so that I would not
have any issues during installation. I turned it on after
installation of all my programs was complete.

Help me to understand how I could have different elevation types if I
have always been logged in under the same user name with the same
rights (as far as I can tell). What do I do to change the rights to
the same (hopefully the GOD level of rights) for everything I do.

On Fri, 26 Sep 2008 07:53:58 -0700 (PDT), eganders
<eganders@xxxxxx> wrote:
Save yourself the aggravation: shut off UAC and take ownership of the
entire C: drive. That will solve most of the problems related to MS's
childish, useless, and highly annoying Vista security scheme.

On Fri, 26 Sep 2008 14:09:28 -0400, Paul Montgumdrop
<Paul@xxxxxx> wrote:
It's even sadder when MS butt kissers try to find excuses to validate
up some of the worst software changes in history,

+Bob+ wrote:

<snipped>

Did I ring your bell? I don't recall ringing your bell to summons you
for anything. Now go on back to your room, Lurch.

D. Eth wrote: Yes, on Linux one as to give that root admin user-id and psw to do
anything which requires admin root privileges. And users on Linux run on
or surf the Internet as a non-root admin user, which prevents something
from installing itself silently on a Web site drive-by as an example. If
something needs root admin privileges to execute, then the root
admin/psw must be given on Linux by the user.

As opposed to Vista with UAC enabled, the user/admin is locked down to a
Standard user while on the Internet, the user/admin must allow or
disallow the action at the UAC prompt or if it is a non-admin user, the
user must give a user-id/psw at the UAC prompt to allow or disallow.

Where is the difference? In both cases, the decision making process is
squarely at the foot of the user to allow or disallow on Linux and Vista
with UAC.

I got maybe five applications I run on the machine that even require the
UAC elevation. And I am not running those applications on a routine
basis nor am I running around installing applications on a routine basis
that require UAC approval.

What I do is surf the Internet as user/admin that is really locked down
to a Standard user, where I have a chance of being alerted if something
dubious might be happening, and it's up to me to allow/disallow.

I would rather do that on Vista and not surf the Internet as user/admin
on XP or Win 2k with full admin rights where everything can install
itself sightly, and I wouldn't have a clue that it has happened, and
most surf the Internet on XP and Win 2k with Full admin rights (wide
opened).

I have a chance to protect myself better with Vista UAC.

"Paul Montgumdrop" <Paul@xxxxxx> wrote in message
news:u5GNb7AIJHA.944@xxxxxx
You seem to understand.
The morons don't.
They degrade the very fundamentals they were tossing squirrels about 2 years
ago.

--
Ens causa sui
Fit caedes omnibus locis

D. Eth wrote: I know. Their hatred of MS blinds them, and they can't see. How people
let anything control them like that is beyond me. But it can, and it
does happen.

On Fri, 26 Sep 2008 16:03:10 -0400, Paul Montgumdrop
<Paul@xxxxxx> wrote:
No, unlike an uneducated putz like you who is incapable of discussing
an issue without throwing insults "hates" a company like MS. I don't
"hate" anyone but I do make objective evaluations of software.

UAC is a massive global block that is poorly designed and implemented.
Instead of building an intelligent scheme for determining what
programs and feature changes should be allowed to run, MS put a
massive block to stop everything and anything from happening,
regardless of the "danger". This results in users being constantly
bombarded with UAC messages. That then causes them to get in the habit
of simply OKing the messages and ignoring any possible security
benefit related or simply shutting off UAC. But, to do any less than
shut it off is to disable the ability to get work done.

OTOH, a properly designed UAC that only popped up when there was truly
a danger would have none of the problems of Vista's UAC and would
actually increase security. MS took the cheap way out and it shows.

Likewise, their file/directory protection scheme consists of globally
prohibiting users from accessing anything but their specified user
areas. This again results in repeated issues with file protection.
Instead of adopting a proper file and directory protection scheme,
they again chose a global block.

Again, the only reasonable solution for anyone but a neophyte user is
to disable it so that they can actually get work done and customize
their system as needed. Once again, MS took the cheap way out and it
shows.

The root of the problem is that MS still doesn't have a proper system
architecture or security structure in place. Years after the promises
of NT providing a proper architecture, application and system software
continues to mix in system directories. Programs and processes
continue to have access to the core operating system when they should
be shut down at the gate.

*That's* what's wrong with Vista security and at MS. A *real* security
model is what users have been asking for - not a simplistic band-aid
applied on top of a poorly designed OS.

If you want to argue the issues, have at it. If you want to throw
insults, go back to the sandbox where you belong.